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I. INTRODUCTION
In issuing remedial decrees in institutional reform cases
against state and local governments, courts should, as we argued in
our book Democracy by Decree, enforce rights and otherwise leave
policy making to elected officials.' We have also argued that
decrees in such cases tend to control policy more than is needed to
enforce rights, even when the need for prophylaxis is taken into full
2account.
The point we emphasize in this essay is that overly broad
consent decrees work an inappropriate shift from judicial protection
of the plaintiffs-in their status as right-holders-to judicial
protection of plaintiffs in a new status-as beneficiaries of a
contract. What starts out as a flexible remedy morphs into a rigid
contract. 3 Holders of rights to social programs are entitled to have
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1. Ross SANDLER & DAVID SCHOENBROD, DEMOCRACY BY DECREE: WHAT
HAPPENS WHEN COURTS RuN GOVERNMENT (2003).
2. On the need for prophylaxis, see Tracy A. Thomas, The Continued
Vitality of Prophylactic Relief 27 REV. LITIG. 99 (2007).
3. See Hecht Co. v. Bowles, 321 U.S. 321, 329-30 (1944) ("The essence of
equity jurisdiction has been the power of the Chancellor to do equity and to mould
each decree to the necessities of the particular case. Flexibility rather than rigidity
has distinguished it. The qualities of mercy and practicality have made equity the
instrument for nice adjustment and reconciliation between the public interest and
private needs as well as between competing private claims.").
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their rights enforced, but not to achieve hegemony over the policy
choices entrusted to public officials.
Our concern is the current court practice that encourages
judges to view consent decrees against governmental officials as
contracts rather than equitable remedies. This not-so-subtle shift in
theory collides with fundamental democratic principles. As Justice
William Brennan wrote in dissent:
One of the fundamental premises of our popular
democracy is that each generation of representatives
can and will remain responsive to the needs and
desires of those whom they represent. Crucial to this
end is the assurance that new legislators will not
automatically be bound by the policies and
undertakings of earlier days.... [N]othing would so
jeopardize the legitimacy of [our] system of
government that relies upon the ebbs and flows of
politics to 'clean out the rascals' than the possibility
that those same rascals might perpetuate their policies
simply by locking them into binding contracts.4
Part II of this essay explains why decrees against state and
local government in institutional reform cases tend to be broader
than needed to enforce rights and thus work a shift from status to
contract. Part III suggests ways to reverse the shift from status to
contract so that consent decrees are confined to their proper business
of protecting rights. Part IV explains why reform is urgent.
The dichotomy between status and contract is, of course, not new. See, e.g.,
HENRY SUMNER MAINE, ANCIENT LAW: ITS CONNECTION WITH THE EARLY
HISTORY OF SOCIETY AND ITS RELATION TO MODERN IDEAS 165 (10th ed. Beacon
Press 1963) (1861) ("[T]he movement of the progressive societies has hitherto
been a movement from Status to Contract.").




II. WHY DECREES AGAINST STATE AND LOCAL GOVERNMENTS
TEND TO BE BROADER THAN NEEDED TO ENFORCE RIGHTS
The bulk of decrees against state and local governments are
negotiated and entered by consent. 5 Those who negotiate the decree
6have objectives that differ from simply enforcing rights. In
targeting a government agency, the plaintiffs' attorneys generally
seek improvement that is as comprehensive as possible.7 As
plaintiffs' attorneys, we did the same ourselves. The agency officials
whom mayors, governors, and their commissioners task to negotiate
with the plaintiffs' attorneys often seek to use the lawsuit as a way to
implement their own favorite ideas and to free themselves from
policy constraints and budget restrictions imposed by other
officials.
8
The negotiators, whom we call "the controlling group," write
a detailed, long-term plan for the government program.9 In the horse
trading that produces the plan, some rights are let slide and
commitments unessential to vindicating any right are included in the
plan because they seem like good ideas to the controlling group.
10
By signature of the trial judge, the plan becomes a consent decree
binding the defendants and their successors in office."
Once the decree is entered, the controlling group usually
continues to meet, often in regularly scheduled sessions closed to the
public. 12 Its job now is to administer the decree, and that typically
results in the decree broadening.' 3 One reason for this broadening is
that some of the hopeful ideas in the original decree prove
unworkable, so defendants must ask plaintiffs' attorneys to consent
to modifications. 14  As the price of consent, plaintiffs usually
demand adding new requirements to the decree.15  As the new
requirements compound, the decree grows from a document into a
5. SANDLER & SCHOENBROD, supra note 1, at 118-19.
6. Id. at 139.
7. Id. at 142-43.
8. Id. at 123-25.
9. Id. at 118.
10. Id. at 123-24.
11. Id. at 127.
12. Id. at 125.
13. Id. at 126-28.
14. Id. at 127-28.
15. Id.
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file folder and, in some cases, into a file drawer or even a file
cabinet.
III. WAYS TO LIMIT DECREES TO ENFORCING RIGHTS
We suggest changing court practices in three areas: (1)
framing the decree, (2) managing the decree, and (3) ending the
decree.
A. Framing the Decree
Persons negotiating a consent decree aimed at reforming a
governmental social program know that changes in agency culture
and performance will likely take years. They anticipate that elected
and appointed officials come and go, that unexpected events and
failures of performance will compel changes of plans and
modifications, that future economic cycles could dramatically affect
resources, and that even the most popular social programs must still
compete annually for funds and leadership with other equally
compelling programs. This reality leads parties to opt for a decree
template designed to defeat the uncertainties of time. The result is
often a complex and rigid decree loaded with specific interim
milestones, cascading obligations that may only marginally relate to
the rights at issue, and outright substitutions warranted only by the
parties' agreement and self-interest.' 
6
This negotiation process, with its generous and unbounded
template, permits the parties to draft new and expanded duties far
beyond the legal requirements actually written into the governing
statute. 17 It is by the creation of new and expanded duties that
today's office holders are able to burden or restrict the options
available to future office holders.
Under the leading Supreme Court case, the trial judge is free
to sign off on such a broad decree if the incumbent defendants
consent and the terms of the decree are related in some loose sense to
the aims of the lawsuit. 18 So long as the defendants consent, judges
16. Id. at 123-24, 126-29.
17. Id. at 123-25.




may approve decrees without considering whether they are broader
than needed to protect rights.1 9  This latitude makes sense in
litigation against private defendants because private litigants can
generally be counted upon to strenuously resist overly broad decrees.
Also, if private defendants over-promise or overly restrict their
successors, it is their private loss, not the public's loss.
This judicial latitude makes little sense, however, in the
context of institutional reform litigation because the burden of the
overbreadth falls upon others-future mayors or governors, the state
or local legislatures, and the public that ultimately foots the bill.
These real parties in interest are usually not parties in the suit. They
often do not know the terms of the proposed decree until it begins to
impact them.
All public officials are temporary holders of governmental
authority. While they and their successors must obey the law, it is
equally true that each of them is forbidden from contracting away the
public's rights to self-government.2 °  Consent decrees that
progressively shrink the authority exercised by elected officials are
operating like contracts rather than equitable remedies.
In our book, Democracy by Decree, we argued that, to
prevent overly broad consent decrees, trial judges should limit the
decree to requirements needed to enforce rights.21 In dicta in a
subsequent opinion, Frew ex rel. Frew v. Hawkins, a unanimous
Supreme Court made the same point: "If not limited to reasonable
and necessary implementations of federal law, remedies outlined in
consent decrees involving state officeholders may improperly
deprive future officials of their designated legislative and executive
powers."
22
For the Supreme Court's admonition to change the practices
of trial courts, new procedures must be accepted. Judges should
begin the remedy phase with findings of fact on the wrong done to
plaintiffs. This "bill of wrongs" would provide the trial judge with a
check on ambitions of the controlling group. For example, where
plaintiffs allege that a public school system is taking too long to
place students in appropriate special education classes and this
condition is illegal and in fact exists, the parties should not be
19. SANDLER & SCHOENBROD, supra note 1, at 167-74.
20. 2A EUGENE MCQUILLIN, THE LAW OF MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS
§ 10.39 (3d ed. 1996).
21. SANDLER & SCHOENBROD, supra note 1, at 45-46.
22. 540 U.S. 431, 441 (2004).
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permitted to enlarge the consent decree to cover other aspects of
special education that are not similarly alleged, illegal, and known to
in fact exist.
A clear, initial statement of the violation establishes
boundaries for the consent decree. The parties could agree to the bill
of wrongs without the defendants exposing themselves to liability in
other cases. This is because § 36 of the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure allows for admissions that are binding only in that case
and in no other.
23
There is a risk of course that the controlling group gins up
whatever findings seem necessary to support the decree it wishes to
enter. Yet, to the extent that the bill of wrongs is fictional, it will
help to alert elected officials, the judge, and the public of excesses in
the decree. In any event, the bill of wrongs will be helpful in
cabining modifications of the decree.
B. Managing the Decree
Running complex governmental social programs calls for
management skills of a very high order. Signing a consent decree
does not repeal this reality. Over time, the controlling group is sure
to experience less than perfect outcomes and outright failures, as
well as evolving and unexpected ideas, policies, and events. Yet
current court practices, following a contract analogy, view motions
to modify consent decrees as attempts to get out of binding
contracts. 24  This might make sense in cases against private
defendants who generally should be held responsible for dealing
away their own prerogatives. But, in litigation against state and local
governments, mayors and governors are dealing away the
prerogatives of their successors in office and the public generally.
25
23. FED. R. Civ. P. 36(b) ("Any admission made by a party under this rule is
for the purpose of the pending action only and is not an admission for any other
purpose nor may it be used against the party in any other proceeding."); See 8A
CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT, ARTHUR R. MILLER, & RICHARD L. MARCUS, FEDERAL
PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 2264, at 531 (2d ed. 1994) ("Any admission obtained
under Rule 36, whether an express admission or an admission by failure to
respond, is for the purpose of the pending action only. It is not an admission for
any other purpose nor may it be used against the party who made it in any other
proceeding.").
24. United States v. ITT Cont'l Baking Co., 420 U.S. 223, 235-37 (1975).
25. SANDLER & SCHOENBROD, supra note 1, at 167-74.
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The Supreme Court made some allowance for this concern in
Rufo v. Inmates of Suffolk County Jail. 26 What it did there, however,
was not enough. Rufo's criteria for modification are framed in
27contract terms. One instance where Rufo allows modification is
where an unforeseen change makes performance more difficult.
2 8
This is a cousin of the contract doctrine of supervening
impracticality. 29 Rufo also requires that the modification be tailored
to the change. 30 This, too, is a cousin of contract doctrine, which in
instances of supervening impracticality enforces the contract to the
extent practicable.
31
Another aspect of Rufo is that the trial judge grant no
deference to defendant officials on the issue of whether the criteria
for modifying the decree have been met.32 This lack of deference
may be appropriate in enforcing contracts of a proprietary nature,
like a purchase contract or bond debt, but not in cases where the
subject of the contract is governmental in nature, as is almost
invariably the case in institutional reform cases.
In our book, we argued that trial judges should permit
governmental officials to modify the terms of a consent decree
whenever they present a reasonable justification for the
modification. 33 A unanimous Supreme Court seemed to agree when
it put a helpful gloss on Rufo in Frew v. Hawkins: "A State, in the
ordinary course, depends upon successor officials, both appointed
and elected, to bring new insights and solutions to problems of
allocating revenues and resources. The basic obligations of federal
law may remain the same, but the precise manner of their discharge
may not."
34
Frew's entire discussion of modification avoids any hint of
contract thinking. 35 Although the Supreme Court has spoken, there
26. 502 U.S. 367 (1992).
27. Id. at 378-83.
28. Id.
29. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 261 (1981).
30. Rufo, 502 U.S. at 391.
31. RESTATEMENT (SECOND)OF CONTRACTS §§ 270, 358 (1981).
32. Rufo, 502 U.S. at 393 n.14 ("[T]he moving party bears the burden of
establishing that a significant change in circumstances warrants modification of a
consent decree. No deference is involved in this threshold inquiry.").
33. SANDLER & SCHOENBROD, supra note 1, at 213-14.
34. Frew ex rel. Frew v. Hawkins, 540 U.S. 431, 442 (2004).
35. See Ross Sandier & David Schoenbrod, The Supreme Court, Democracy
and Institutional Reform Litigation, 49 N.Y.L. SCH. L. REv. 915-23 (2005)
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is reason to suppose that lower courts have, for the most part, failed
to pay attention. In the Frew case itself, on remand, the appellate
court refused to grant deference to state officials, discounted the
state's claims that it was in compliance with the federal law, and
refused to terminate the decree. 36
C. Ending the Decree
The problem here is that current court practices require
decrees to remain in force longer than needed to enforce plaintiffs'
rights. Termination requires compliance with not only the law, but
also with all the contractual obligations that the controlling group has
written into the consent decree. For example, a federal statute may
require a state to establish a system to notify children of available
health services, while a consent decree based on that statute may
have enlarged that right to include multiple costly and repetitive
attempts to locate children eligible for the program. In our view, a
successor official should be able to get the court to terminate a
multiple notification obligation written into a consent decree so long
as that official has come into compliance with federal law.
Obligations agreed to by the prior official, however worthy, should
not, without statutory support, limit the successor's choices. Overly
broad consent decrees may, as the Supreme Court succinctly
observed in Frew, "lead to federal-court oversight of state programs
for long periods of time even absent an ongoing violation of federal
law."
38
In our book, we recommended that decrees should end at a
fixed time unless plaintiffs can show that the decree is still needed to
enforce rights. A bill that got substantial and bipartisan support, the
Federal Consent Decree Fairness Act, 39 would have produced this
(observing that the court in Frew encourages a new level of deference to local
officials when modifying existing consent decrees, in contrast to the rigid Rufo
standard).
36. Frazar v. Ladd, 457 F.3d 432 (5th Cir. 2006). The court applied the Rufo
standard, stating that it rejected the argument that Frew "ushers in a new standard
for consent decree modification." Id. at 438.
37. Bd. of Educ. of Okla. City Pub. Sch. v. Dowell, 498 U.S. 237, 249-50
(1991).
38. Frew, 540 U.S. at 441.
39. Federal Consent Decree Fairness Act, S. 489, 109th Cong. (2005)
(introduced March 1, 2005 by Senator Lamar Alexander (R-TN)); Federal Consent
[Vol. 27:1
CONSENT DECREES
result as well as implementing our recommendation on modifying
consent decrees. The chief argument of the opponents of the bill was
that plaintiffs would litigate rather than settle, thus making work for
the courts and the parties. 40 This argument is, however, not credible.
Plaintiffs have many reasons to settle. If the decree is litigated, it is
subject to appeal, and the Supreme Court has imposed stiff limits on
the scope of court-imposed decrees where the parties have not
consented.4' Consent decrees provide faster relief for clients, faster
payment of attorney fees for the plaintiffs' lawyer, and eliminate the
risk of losing the case. Besides, the plaintiffs can keep the decree in
force if it is still necessary to protect rights.
The Federal Consent Decree Fairness Act is not a one-off
copy of the Prison Litigation Reform Act (PLRA) and lacks some of
its most controversial features. 42 Professor Margo Schlanger's study
of the impact of the Prison Litigation Reform Act on decrees shows
that it did not do away with existing decrees or prevent the entry of
Decree Fairness Act, H.R. 1229, 109th Cong. (2005) (introduced March 1, 2005 by
Representative Roy Blunt (R-MO)).
40. E.g., HumanRigtsWatch.org, Letter Opposing Consent Decree Fairness
Act, http://hrw.org/english/docs/2005/04/13/usdomlO482.htm (last visited Dec. 3,
2007) (signed by multiple advocacy groups) ("Th[e] burden of proof provision-
which reverses decades of existing law that places the burden on the defendants-
creates an additional disincentive for plaintiffs to settle .... "); Federal Consent
Decree Fairness Act: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Courts, the Internet, and
Intellectual Property of the H. Comm. on the Judiciary, 109th Cong. 13 (statement
of Rep. Berman, Member, House Comm. on the Judiciary) ("I can't think of why
any plaintiff, whether it's the Federal Government or a private party, will ever
settle a case. Why won't they want to litigate everything to a final judgment,
which isn't, obviously, subject to that kind of automatic review and requirement
that you reprove your case. So I think it eliminates settlements.").
41. E.g., Lewis v. Casey, 518 U.S. 343, 357 (1996) ("The actual-injury
requirement would hardly serve the purpose ... of preventing courts from
undertaking tasks assigned to the political branches ... if once a plaintiff
demonstrated harm from one particular inadequacy in government administration,
the court were authorized to remedy all inadequacies in that administration.").
42. For example, The Federal Consent Decree Fairness Act, unlike the
PLRA, had no bearing on damages claims and did not require exhaustion of
administrative remedies. Compare S. 489, 109th Cong. (2005), with 42 U.S.C.
§ 1997e (2000). The version of the Federal Consent Decree Fairness Act that we
supported in the end lacked the PLRA's limit on fees for masters and attorneys,
and contained no automatic stay if the trial court failed to rule on a motion to
modify or terminate by a set time limit.
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new ones. Indeed, she had to work hard to show that it had any
substantial impact.43
IV. CONCLUSION: THE URGENCY OF REFORM
Adoption of these suggestions would have two impacts.
First, it would require more, rather than less, involvement by the trial
judge. The trial judge would be compelled to scrutinize the draft
consent decree to ensure that the decree does not go beyond the
rights violated. This is an appropriate role for the trial judge, who,
for both practical and legal reasons, provides the main restraint on
the parties. Second, adoption of these suggestions would provide a
sound basis for consideration of motions to modify and terminate
consent decrees, and appellate review of the disposition of those
motions.
The controlling group of lawyers and officials who manage a
consent decree is free from constraint to a considerable degree. The
plaintiff class is often too large and uninformed to provide much of a
check on its attorneys. The governors and mayors have personal,
political, and practical reasons for going along with the controlling
group. The state legislatures and municipal councils are usually not
parties to the case and often do not know much about the decree until
after it is entered. The same is true of members of the public who
may be affected or harmed by the decree. The federal agency
charged with enforcing the statute usually plays little or no part in
the process. There is no appeal from the entry of a consent decree,
so the appellate courts provide no check. Once the decree is entered,
current court practices on modification and termination restrict the
44ability of appellate courts to limit the decree to its proper scope.
Our suggestions would shift the evaluation of decrees from
contract principles to traditional equity principles. The difference is
substantial: Contract doctrine allows great latitude to the parties as
they negotiate the agreement, and then tends to narrow the relevant
factors on judicial review to the four corners of the contract.
45
43. Margo Schlanger, Civil Rights Injunctions Over Time: A Case Study of
Jail and Prison Court Orders, 81 N.Y.U. L. REv. 550, 583-84 (2006).
44. SANDLER & SCHOENBROD, supra note 1, ch. 5.
45. See Firefighters Local Union No. 1784 v. Stotts, 467 U.S. 561, 574
(1984) ("It is to be recalled that the 'scope of a consent decree must be discerned
within its four comers, and not by reference to what might satisfy the purposes of
[Vol. 27:1
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Equity doctrine, on the other hand, limits the scope of the initial
decree to only what is needed, and then on judicial review broadens
the relevant factors by looking beyond the agreement to additional
factors such as the impact of the contract on the democratic values
of state and local governments.
Doctrines based upon contract, when applied to institutional
reform litigation, render governments less able to resolve social
disputes through democratic processes. As Justice Jackson argued in
an earlier era when judges sought to limit governmental authority,
"The vice of judicial supremacy, as exerted for ninety years in the
field of policy, has been its progressive closing of the avenues to
peaceful and democratic conciliation of our social and economic
conflicts. 46 This statement was written in 1941, and the judicial
interventions Jackson opposed prevented government from
addressing the social issues of the 1930s. Today, judicial
management of consent decrees as contracts has had a similar effect
of closing the avenues to peaceful and democratic conciliation of our
contemporary social and economic conflicts.
one of the parties to it' or by what 'might have been written had the plaintiff
established his factual claims and legal theories in litigation."' (quoting U.S. v.
Armour & Co., 402 U.S. 673, 682 (1971))).
46. ROBERT H. JACKSON, THE STRUGGLE FOR JUDICIAL SUPREMACY: A
STUDY OF A CRISIS IN AMERICAN POWER POLITICS 321 (Octagon Books 1979)
(1941).
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